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SEX OFFENDERS, UNLAWFUL COMBATANTS,
AND PREVENTIVE DETENTION
MICHAEL LouIs CORRADO*
This Article is about preventive detention-detaining people on
grounds of dangerousness alone. I want to argue in this Article that
unless the detainee is insane or unable to control her behavior, the
threat of punishment should not be abandoned as a device for
controlling behavior in favor of indefinite preventive detention. In
particular I argue that this is even true in the case of terrorists and
enemy combatants. I then argue that in spite of a series of recent
cases expanding the right of legislatures to authorize preventive
detention, it is still consistent with our jurisprudence to draw the line
where I am suggesting. The recent Hamdi case really didn't address
this point. Hamdi said: (1) that Congress had authorized detention
of enemy combatants for the duration of the war in Afghanistan,
but not for the duration of the war on terror; and (2) that Hamdi
was entitled to a (very minimal) hearing to allow him to rebut the
charge that he was in fact an enemy combatant. If he failed to rebut
it, then the military could continue to detain him for the remainder
of the war. The Administration, of course, was arguing that it
should be left entirely in their hands to determine whether someone
was an enemy combatant, and when would be a propitious time to
release or try them, if ever. In other words, indefinite detention.
The first rationale for the detention, one accepted by all courts, was
to keep them from returning to enemy lines (on the administration's
account, that would be any terrorist group anywhere in the world).
The second, treated with more suspicion, was for interrogation. In
the administration's view, whether someone should be given a trial
(like Lindh) or detained (like Hamdi and Padilla) depended on
how useful their information was to the government. The Court's
ruling limited the government in two ways: it required an
immediate minimal hearing; and it limited detention without trial to
the remainder of the actual fighting in Afghanistan only. What the
Court did not address, because it did not have to, was the
constitutional question whether Congress COULD authorize
indefinite detention if it had wanted to. I focus on that question
here.
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INTRODUCTION
In the recent Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,1 Rumsfeld v. Padilla,2 and
Rasul v. Bush3 cases, the Supreme Court answered many but not all of
the questions that were raised by the recently declared war on terror.
One question not answered was this: to what extent may Congress
authorize indefinite detention of citizens not convicted of any crime?
Ronald Dworkin, in a recent article on the three cases, argues that:
[T]he justices' arguments provide the legal basis for a much
more powerful conclusion than the Court itself drew-that the
* Arch Allen Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy, The University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill. I want to thank the Law School for its support during the writing
of this paper, and the Faculty of Jurisprudence of the University of Bologna and Professor
Giulio Illuminati for the opportunity to present an early version of this paper as a "Cycle
of Lectures" during the week of May 2-8, 2004. I am also grateful to my assistants, Brian
Oten, James Langston, John Veazey, Shana Starnes, and Chris Waldon for help in
research.
1. 542 U.S. 507, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). Throughout the remainder of this Article,
the Supreme Court Reporter is used for citations to Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Rumsfeld v.
Padilla, and Rasul v. Bush because pinpoint citations to the United States Reports were
unavailable at the time of publication.
2. 542 U.S. 426, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).
3. 542 U.S. 466, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
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Constitution does not permit the government to hold suspected
enemy combatants or terrorists indefinitely without charging
and convicting them of crimes ... unless they are treated in
effect as prisoners of war.4
The burden of my argument is that the Court should come to
that conclusion, but it is wishful thinking to suppose that the Court
has already reached that conclusion or has even laid the legal basis for
it. The Court decided that the Congress had not in fact authorized
indefinite detention but only detention for as long as the war in
Afghanistan should last.' But precisely because it reached the
conclusion that Congress had not authorized indefinite detention, it
had no reason to reach the constitutional issue of whether Congress
could authorize indefinite detention.
The central issue in Hamdi, the only one of the three cases that
reached beyond jurisdictional issues,6 was whether in fact Congress
had authorized the executive branch to detain Hamdi without a
hearing.7 Hamdi claimed-or rather Hamdi's father, who filed the
lawsuit, claimed-that the government intended to detain him
indefinitely,8 and the government did not deny Hamdi's claim. 9 The
government, in fact, asserted both Article II authority in the
President himself, and authority from Congress, under the
Authorization for Use of Military Force ("AUMF"),1° for the power
to detain unlawful combatants for as long as the war on terror
4. Ronald Dworkin, What the Court Really Said, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Aug. 12,
2004, at 26. "
5. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2641-42.
6. In Padilla the Court determined that the habeas action was brought against the
wrong respondent. 124 S. Ct. at 2721-22. In Rasul, the only question was whether the
U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, was within the jurisdiction of United States
courts. 124 S. Ct. at 2698.
7. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2635.
8. Id. at 2636.
9. Id. "The Government contends that Hamdi is an 'enemy combatant,' and that this
status justifies holding him in the United States indefinitely-without formal charges or
proceedings-unless and until it makes the determination that access to counsel or further
process is warranted." Id. In its Brief, the government asserted that the detention might
be indefinite but that didn't mean that Hamdi would never be released. Brief for the
Respondents at 16, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (No. 03-6696) ("The military has
made clear that it has no intention of holding captured enemy combatants any longer than
necessary in light of the interests of national security, and scores of captured enemy
combatants have been released by the United States or transferred to the custody of other
governments.").
10. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2000 &
Supp. 2002).
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lasted.1' The Court did not reach the issue of direct executive
authority to detain because, it believed, Congress had in fact
authorized the detention. 12  In answer to the central question,
however, the Court held that Hamdi was entitled to process
permitting him to test the grounds of his detention. 3 As to whether
the AUMF authorized indefinite detention once that process was
granted, the Court's answer is that it did not, at least not in the sense
that detention might last as long as an indefinite war on terror. 4 But
the Court never even raised the issue of whether Congress could,
under the Constitution, authorize the indefinite detention of those
not convicted of crimes."
The district court in Padilla,6 however, did reach that last issue.
Judge Mukasey, of the Southern District of New York, traced the
recent line of cases that carved out the constitutionality of indefinite
detention:
[I]nsofar as the argument assumes that indefinite confinement
of one not convicted of a crime is per se unconstitutional, that
assumption is simply wrong. In Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S.
346 (1997), the Court upheld Kansas's Sexually Violent
Predator Act, providing for civil commitment of those who, due
to "mental abnormality" or "personality disorder" are likely to
commit sexually predatory acts .... See also United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987) ... Moyer v. Peabody, 212
U.S. 78, 84 (1909) .... To be sure, the standard of proof in
some of those cases may well have been higher than the
11. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2639.
12. The plurality of four so held, id., and Justice Thomas's opinion concurred in that
point. Id. at 2674 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 2648 (majority opinion).
14. The Court did say it agreed "that indefinite detention for the purpose of
interrogation is not authorized" under the congressional AUMF Resolution. Id. at 2641
(emphasis added). But the purpose of interrogation contrasts with the general purpose of
keeping combatants out of the battle that the Court treats as the underlying reason for
detention. Id. at 2641-42.
15. Justice O'Connor, speaking for a majority on this point, held that on remand
Hamdi had to be given some meaningful and immediate opportunity to contest his
detention. Id. at 2648-49. She also held that-whether or not section 4001a required
explicit congressional authorization for detention, and whether or not that requirement
applied to military detention (things the Court did not have to decide)-Congress had in
fact explicitly authorized the detention in the AUMF, id. at 2639, understood in the light
of "universal agreement and practice" as to the incidents of war. Id. at 2640 (quoting Ex
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942)).
16. Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), affd in part,
rev'd in part sub nor. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd, 542 U.S. 426,
124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).
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standard ultimately will be found to be in this case, but the
point is that there is no per se ban.17
Judge Mukasey then went on to discuss Zadvydas v. Davis,8
wherein the Court limited detention for aliens awaiting deportation.' 9
Mukasey pointed out that the limitation was not intended to apply to
the terrorist case before his court: "[T]he Court was careful to point
out that the case before it did not involve 'terrorism or other special
circumstances where special arguments might be made for forms of
preventive detention and for heightened deference to the judgments
of the political branches with respect to matters of national
security.' 20
There remains room for disagreement as to whether, in the
AUMF, Congress intended to give the President the power to detain
indefinitely. But the more important issue is not one of statutory
interpretation. It is the question whether Congress itself has the
power to authorize indefinite detention of dangerous persons where
there has not been a conviction, or on the other hand whether, as
Judge Mukasey put it, there is a per se ban on such detention. In our
history there is little precedent for indefinite detention of responsible
individuals on grounds of dangerousness.
2 1
The question I am raising does not concern habeas corpus, of
course.2 2 My question is whether, once he has been given the minimal
hearing that the Hamdi decision says habeas corpus requires, 23 a
17. Id. at 591.
18. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
19. Id. at 689.
20. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 591 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696).
21. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 528 (E.D. Va. 2002), rev'd, 316 F.3d 450
(4th Cir. 2003), vacated, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). "This case appears to be the first in
American jurisprudence where an American citizen has been held incommunicado and
subjected to an indefinite detention in the continental United States without charges,
without any findings by a military tribunal, and without access to a lawyer." Id.
22. The Constitution does permit Congress to suspend the writ when "in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. The
very fact that provision is made for its suspension argues against the supposition that
Congress might otherwise authorize detention without trial.
23. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2648-49 (2004). Hamdi is a citizen, and
so the ruling is limited to citizen-detainees. Such an individual "must receive notice of the
factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut" the allegations
supporting the classification. Id. at 2648. In other respects, however, the proceedings
could be "tailored" to the case, so that, for example, hearsay might be admitted, and the
burden might be put on the detainee to disprove the allegations underlying the
classification. Id. at 2649. There is no mention of a right to silence, or to confront his
accuser. The Court did hold that Hamdi "unquestionably" had the right to an attorney on
remand. Id. at 2652.
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combatant may be held for an indefinite period without trial before
civil or military courts. But the questions are clearly related. Once
upon a time, it seems, the privilege of habeas corpus could be
assumed to eliminate the possibility of indefinite detention without
trial.24 One who was detained on suspicion of dangerous activity had
to be brought before a court for a hearing and then speedily tried."
But that assumption has eroded over the last fifteen or so years, and
Judge Mukasey has traced the erosion in Supreme Court cases that
expand Congress's authority to authorize preventive detention.26
United States v. Salerno27 may be seen as the opening move-the
"entering wedge."2" In Salerno the Court declared, over strong
dissent, that detention for short periods for the purpose of regulating
dangerous activity was not punishment and, hence, was permissible
without trial and conviction. 9  In Kansas v. Hendricks,3 ° the
understanding of regulation was expanded to permit indefinite
detention of those many consider "the vile and the worthless:"'"
24. See supra note 22.
25. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1973); Barker
v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 536 (1972); Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374,382 (1969).
26. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text. In Punishment and the Wild Beast
of Prey: The Problem of Preventive Detention, I define "pure" preventive detention as the
detention of dangerous individuals who are responsible for what they do. See Michael
Louis Corrado, Punishment and the Wild Beast of Prey: The Problem of Preventive
Detention, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 778, 791 (1996). I will try to avoid the use of
that locution here. Preventive detention, as I use the term here, is simply the detention of
dangerous individuals for the purpose of preventing future harm. Christopher Slobogin
defines pure preventive detention slightly differently: "[A] deprivation of liberty that is
based on a prediction of harmful conduct and that is not time-limited by culpability or
other considerations (such as a pending trial)." Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of
Dangerousness, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2003).
27. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
28. These are the words used by Representative Randolph, speaking about a bill
proposed by President Jefferson that would have suspended the right to habeas corpus for
just three months so that Jefferson might detain, without trial, several individuals charged
with treason. Randolph, who was in other things an ally of the President, said on the floor
of the House:
If the bill passes, we are told, it will be but temporary .... As to its three months'
continuance, I consider that as one of the most objectionable features of the bill-
as a bait to the trap; as the entering wedge. If it is made reconcilable to the
interests and feelings of this House to pass it for three months, do you think we
will then feel the same lively repugnance to it that we now do? No!
16 ANNALS OF CONG. 421 (1807).
29. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746-47.
30. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
31. Representative Randolph of Virginia said as well:
[T]here is no need of much exertion in behalf of good men. Attacks on the liberty
of the people are.., made always in the persons of the vile and the worthless. But
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sexual predators.32 In Zadvydas v. Davis,33 the Court suggested (but
did not hold) that the same might apply in the case of terrorists.34 If
Judge Mukasey is right, these cases demonstrate that there is no per
se ban on Congress's authority to order the indefinite detention of
enemy combatants without trial.35
Certainly the Court can go in that direction. It can expand its
understanding of the Constitution to permit Congress to authorize
indefinite detention in these cases once there has been process. But it
doesn't have to go that way. The Court can, consistent with its
decided cases, reach a conclusion of the sort that Dworkin is looking
for.36 The Court can decide that the Constitution does not permit the
indefinite detention of those apprehended during wartime who have
been neither convicted of a crime nor adjudged prisoners of war.
That is the conclusion that must be reached on moral and political
grounds, and it is consistent, I will argue, with the Court's precedent.
The argument of this Article proceeds like this: in Part I, I
review the series of cases starting with Salerno that begin to expand
the legislature's right to detain for the purpose of preventing future
crimes. My question is, has the Supreme Court really said that
legislatures have the right to authorize indefinite detention? Salerno
was about pretrial detention. Traditionally, and still in some states,
bail was denied only to insure the integrity of the criminal process.37
The Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984 permitted denial of bail to
prevent future crimes.38 It was controversial for that reason, and
several district courts and one circuit court struck it down.39 It was
upheld in the Supreme Court largely on the ground that it was not
when precedent is once established in the case of bad men, who like pioneers go
before to smooth the way, good men tremble for their safety.
16 ANNALS OF CONG. 538 (1807) (emphasis added).
32. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363-64.
33. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
34. Id. at 691.
35. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text. By "indefinite preventive
detention," I mean detention for more than a short period defined by some external event
(which may be for as long as two or three years or more, as in the case of pretrial
detention) without either trial on criminal charges or release.
36. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
37. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 (1979); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114-
15 (1975); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1951).
38. Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 202-10, 98 Stat. 1837, 1976-87
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-50 (2000)).
39. See infra Part I.A.
2005]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
punishment and, therefore, not punishment without conviction.4" It
was only regulation-regulation of dangerous activity.
The other cases, more briefly: Foucha v. Louisiana" seemed to
take a step back. It said that someone who was "not guilty by reason
of insanity" ("NGRI"), but had recovered his sanity, had to be
released from commitment.4" This would have been no big surprise
except that after Salerno the Court could have called it "regulation"
and approved the continued detention (which would have been
indefinite detention). 43  Hendricks went the other way again,
approving indefinite detention for sexual predators, after they have
served their penal sentences."a Zadvydas went back in the direction
of Foucha, declaring that an undesirable and deportable alien could
not be held indefinitely just because the Immigration and
Naturalization Service could not find a country to deport him to; thus,
no indefinite detention.45 However, the Court did note that it was an
open question whether indefinite detention might be acceptable for
terrorists.46 Kansas v. Crane47 revisited the sexual predator question
and said that although indefinite detention was acceptable there, it
was only acceptable if the detainee was unable to control his
behavior.4" Finally came Hamdi, which I have already discussed.49
I then in Part II try to come to some conclusion about what the
right thing to do would be, independent of constitutional
considerations. I begin with a theory of preventive detention that
argues that "inability to control" is an incoherent notion, and that
sexual predators can respond to punishment and should be punished
only and not detained. I try to show that these arguments don't work.
I then turn to an alternative theory, which is that mere
"undeterrability" is the criterion, and that not only should sexual
predators be detained, but those who are sane and in control but so
40. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746-47 (1987); see infra Part I.A.
41. 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
42. Id. at 73.
43. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747.
44. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1997).
45. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001).
46. Id. at 691.
47. 534 U.S. 407 (2002).
48. Id. at 411-13.
49. The district court in the related Padilla case was the only court to discuss the
question I am interested in, and relying on the line of cases I have just laid out determined
that there was no per se ban on indefinite detention of enemy combatants. Padilla ex rel.
Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 591 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), affd in part, rev'd in part sub




committed to a cause that they do not fear death should also be
detained. Terrorists are the obvious cases; the suicide bomber is the
paradigm. I try to show that these arguments also don't work, and
that this theory has unpleasant consequences. In the end I propose
drawing the line at those who cannot conform to the law, including
those not in control of their behavior.
In Part III I argue that the above thesis-which would block the
indefinite detention of terrorists and enemy combatants, should
Congress in a mood of fervent patriotism decide to go that way-is
consistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence. I go back through the
cases and show that, given what the Court has said so far, it is still
open to the Court to find that such authority is just not in the
Constitution."
I. RECENT JURISPRUDENCE ON PREVENTIVE DETENTION
Contemporary detention jurisprudence has developed across
several contexts including pretrial detention, commitment of the
mentally ill, and detention of sexual predators, undesirable aliens, and
unlawful combatants. We begin by surveying the development of
contemporary detention jurisprudence, from Salerno through the
recent enemy combatant cases.51
A. Salerno and Pretrial Detention
In the early 1980s, Congress passed the Bail Reform Act of
1984.52 This statute required judges to deny release on bail if they
were satisfied that the crimes the accused was charged with were
serious, and that the accused was likely, while out on bail, to commit
more crimes of that sort.53 The period of detention was limited, in the
50. Congress can suspend the writ of habeas corpus, but for what I consider a well-
defined period, not at the discretion of a presidential administration. The more important
point is that the existence of that clause in the Constitution supports the view that
Congress cannot otherwise deny someone the right to a criminal trial. See supra note 22
and accompanying text.
51. For contemporary discussion, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary
Power: The Meaning and Impact of Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365, 369-73
(2002); Corrado, supra note 26, at 780-88; Adam J. Falk, Sex Offenders, Mental Illness,
and Criminal Responsibility: The Constitutional Boundaries of Civil Commitment after
Kansas v. Hendricks, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 117, 124-36 (1999); Slobogin, supra note 26,
passim.
52. Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 202-10, 98 Stat. 1837, 1976-87
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-50 (2000)).
53. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e).
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nature of the thing, to the pretrial period.54 The reach of the statute
was limited in a number of other ways:
" Its application was limited to the most serious crimes."
* There had to be a prompt hearing to determine whether the
accused would be detained. 6
* The government had to prove by "clear and convincing
evidence" that the accused presented a specific threat to the
community."
" The accused was to be held "to the extent practicable" in a
facility separate from the regular prison population. 8
Most of the federal courts of appeal that considered the law
upheld it as constitutional. 9 The Second Circuit, however, held that
the law was unconstitutional, saying that the concept of substantive
due process, embodied in the Fifth Amendment, "prohibits the total
deprivation of liberty simply as a means of preventing future
crimes."' In an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the
Supreme Court disagreed.61 In response to the defendant's argument
that pretrial detention on the basis of dangerousness is impermissible
punishment before trial, the Court declared that such detention was
not punishment. 6z Whether something is punishment, the Court
argued, depends first upon whether it is intended as punishment.
63 If
it was not intended as punishment, then it will not be considered
impermissible if any other rational explanation for it can be found, so
long as it is not excessive in relation to that explanation.64 Congress
did not intend this detention as punishment, but as "a potential
solution to a pressing societal problem. There is no doubt that
preventing danger to the community is a legitimate regulatory goal.
65
54. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987).
55. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. § 3142(i)(2).
59. See United States v. Walker, 805 F.2d 1042 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Rodriguez, 803 F.2d 1102 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); United States v. Simpkins, 801
F.2d 520 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (per curiam); United States v. Zannino, 798 F.2d 544 (1st Cir.
1986) (per curiam); United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 864 (1986); United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758 (7th Cir. 1985).
60. United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64, 71-72 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481 U.S. 739
(1987).
61. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 741 (1987).
62. Id. at 746.
63. Id. at 747.
64. Id.
65. Id. (citations omitted).
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And the Court found that the detention was not excessive in light of
the fact that it was limited to the pretrial period, which because of the
Speedy Trial Act cannot be excessive, and that it was limited to the
most serious crimes.66 The Court conceded that every individual has
a strong interest in the liberty guaranteed by the Constitution and
called it a fundamental right. But where the government's interest is
"sufficiently weighty," that right may "be subordinated to the greater
needs of society."'67
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall characterized the case
as the first one in which the Court had to consider a statute "in which
Congress declares that a person innocent of any crime may be jailed
indefinitely, pending the trial of allegations which are legally
presumed to be untrue," and said that the decision was contrary to
"basic principles of justice."'  Marshall also argued that by labeling
the detention "regulation" rather than "punishment," the majority
eviscerated one of the fundamental protections we have against the
power of the state. 69
There is something right about Justice Marshall's dissent, as we
will see. But he was wrong, as the majority pointed out, to
characterize the detention as indefinite, since it was limited to the
pretrial period.7" And I think he was wrong to insist that the
detention be labeled punishment. Whatever we think about
permissibility of detention solely on grounds of future dangerousness,
it is not punishment.71
B. Foucha and Commitment of the Mentally Ill
Someone who is tried for a crime may plead the affirmative
defense of NGRI." While the details of the defense of insanity differ
66. Id.
67. Id. at 750-51.
68. Id. at 755 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 760.
70. Id. at 747 (majority opinion).
71. See Corrado, supra note 26, at 779; see also Michael Corrado, Punishment,
Quarantine, and Preventive Detention, 15 CRIM. JUST. ETHICs 4, 10 (1996). For an
interesting discussion of the German way of allocating retribution and incapacitation, see
Nora Demleitner, Abusing State Power or Controlling Risk?: Sex Offender Commitment
and Sicherungsverwahrung, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1621 (2003).
72. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1985) (discussing mental disease or defect
excluding responsibility); 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 47 (1998); JOSHUA DRESSLER,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 338-39 (3d ed. 2001).
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from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, many of the elements are the same.73
If the jury acquits on grounds of insanity, the defendant will be
confined to await a release hearing.74 If, as is normally the case after
an NGRI acquittal, he is found to remain mentally ill and dangerous,
he will not be released. He will receive a release hearing periodically,
but so long as he remains both mentally ill and dangerous, he may be
detained indefinitely.75
Some fifteen years ago a number of states tried to change the
rules so that after acquittal, an offender would be released only if he
proved that he was no longer dangerous.76 That would mean that he
would be detained if he remained dangerous, even if he were no
longer mentally ill.77 The result in the case of those who regained
their sanity but remained dangerous would be indefinite preventive
detention of the sane, or indefinite pure preventive detention. The
question that arose, then, was whether such detention was
constitutional.
Louisiana was one of the states to make this change in the rules.78
The issue came before the Supreme Court in 1992 in Foucha v.
Louisiana.79 Foucha had been charged with aggravated burglary, but
was found not guilty by reason of insanity and was committed to a
state hospital.8" When he later applied for release, release was denied
under the new statute.81 Although it was found that he was no longer
mentally ill, he remained dangerous to himself or others.'
73. This is assuming that the jurisdiction has an insanity defense. There are a number
of jurisdictions now where no insanity defense is available. See DRESSLER, supra note 72,
at 358-59.
74. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.08 (1985) (discussing the legal effect of acquittal on
the ground of mental disease or defect excluding responsibility, commitment, release, or
discharge); 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 79 (1998); DRESSLER, supra note 72, at 352.
75. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 77 (1992).
76. See David S. Wisz, States' Rights to Confine "Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity"
Acquittees after Foucha v. Louisiana, 82 KY. L.J. 315, 336 (1994) (citing CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1026.2(e) (West 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 403(b) (1987); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 704-415 (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3428(3) (1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-
14-301(3) (1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-268.1(j) (1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-181(3)
(1990); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.200(2) (1990); WIS. STAT. § 971.17(4) (1991); IOWA R.
CRIM. PROC. 21.8(e)).
77. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-276.1 (1991) (providing for detention so long as the
acquittee remained dangerous, whether or not he had recovered his sanity) (amended
1995).
78. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 657 (1981) (amended Supp. 1996).
79. 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
80. Id. at 73-74.




The Court struck down the statute under which Foucha was
denied release.83 The Court held that mere dangerousness was not
enough by itself to justify his confinement in a mental institution. 84 It
said, "[d]ue process requires that the nature of commitment bear
some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is
committed .... Foucha is not suffering from a mental disease or
illness. If he is to be held, he should not be held as a mentally ill
person."85
Applying the notion of substantive due process to the issue of
commitment, the Court said, "[f]reedom from bodily restraint has
always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause from arbitrary governmental action."86 The Court agreed that
the state may imprison convicted criminals for the purposes of
deterrence and retribution but did not see any such punitive purpose
in the detention of Foucha.87 By acquitting him of the crime, the state
exempted him from criminal responsibility. "As Foucha was not
convicted, he may not be punished."8
The Court admitted that detention of dangerous persons who are
not mentally ill is permissible under certain narrow circumstances,
and it referred to Salerno, the pretrial detention case, as an example.
In Salerno, the detention was limited in time, was limited to the most
serious crimes, granted the accused certain procedural protections,
and was narrowly focused on a particularly serious problem. 9 The
Louisiana statute was not so constrained, so the Court struck it
down. 90
In his dissent, Justice Thomas argued that although there may be
an interest in liberty that is protected by the Due Process Clause, an
interest is not the same as a fundamental right. 91 There is no general
fundamental right to freedom from bodily restraint that applies to all
persons, according to Justice Thomas.' "If convicted prisoners could
claim such a right, for example, we would subject all prison sentences
to strict scrutiny." 93 Since freedom from physical restraint was not a
83. Id. at 86.
84. Id. at 82.
85. Id. at 79 (citations omitted).
86. Id. at 80.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 81.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 117 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 118.
93. Id.
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fundamental right in this case, Justice Thomas said, it should not be
subjected to strict scrutiny.94 Therefore, if the state has some
reasonable explanation for why those who were acquitted by reason
of insanity should continue to be detained, even after they become
sane again, then the law should be upheld. 9 And there is a
reasonable explanation in this case: the insanity defense might be
misused. Those who are acquitted by reason of insanity might, in
fact, not be insane.96 To prevent this misuse of the defense, the state
might want to detain them even after they can prove they are sane.97
But according to the majority, the statute was unconstitutional.
Although the Court did not say so explicitly, it evidently considered
the right of Foucha to his freedom once he had regained his
competence to be a fundamental right and the violation of this right
not justified by the state's meager rationalization.
C. Hendricks and the Detention of Sexual Predators
Sexual crimes, especially those involving children, have gotten a
great deal of attention and have produced a number of innovative,
but constitutionally questionable, remedies over the last several
decades.98 For the purposes of our discussion of preventive detention,
what is of interest is the type of statute that was at issue in Kansas v.
Hendricks,99 a statute that combines punishment with preventive
detention for sexual offenders. Under statutes of this sort, someone
who has committed a sexual crime and who qualifies as a "sexual
predator" may, after he has served his prison sentence for the crime,
be preventively confined for an indefinite period, until he is
considered no longer dangerous.1" The typical statute provides for
94. Id. at 119.
95. Id. at 111.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.07(7)(a)
(West 2003); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.005 (1989 & Supp. 2005); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 71.09.040(1) (2002 & Supp. 2005).
99. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
100. There was an earlier period during which the states adopted "sexual psychopath
legislation."
Starting in the 1950s, sexual psychopaths, however defined, were targeted for
indefinite detention. Many of these offenders were not dangerous, but were
considered socially deviant, and upon conviction were either sentenced or
committed civilly. During the early- to mid-1990s, a number of states
reinvigorated their civil commitment statutes for sex offenders, despite the
criticism levied against earlier legislation.., and its abolition during the 1970s.
Demleitner, supra note 71, at 1629-30 (footnotes omitted).
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certain procedural safeguards. Under the Kansas statute, for
example, the offender is entitled to counsel and to a hearing before a
jury to determine whether he qualifies as a sexual predator.10'
This application to the defendant of both punishment-implying
that he is responsible for the crime-and preventive detention-
implying that he is too dangerous to release-forces us to rethink our
justification for commitment of the insane. If the defendant is
responsible for his behavior, and thus may be punished, we cannot
base our justification of his subsequent detention on the fact that he is
dangerous and unresponsible. But if he is responsible and yet may be
detained on grounds of dangerousness, how can we insist that the
insane may be committed indefinitely only if they are both dangerous
and insane, as we saw the Court do in Foucha?
Since the sexual offender will not usually be legally insane,
commitment under the Kansas statute would be preventive detention,
and the issue was whether it was constitutional. The Supreme Court
of Kansas had struck down the statute." z It had declared that
substantive due process requires the state to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the person who is to be civilly committed is
both mentally ill and dangerous. 103 The Kansas court certainly had
reason to believe that such a conclusion followed from the substantive
due process reasoning in the Foucha opinion, handed down just five
years earlier.""° Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court
reversed.' Justice Thomas, speaking for the Court, said once more
101. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a06. As far as procedural due process goes, the Kansas
statute provides even greater procedural protections than those found in Salerno. If a
court finds "probable cause" to believe that the offender is a sexually violent predator,
there must be a professional evaluation. § 59-29a05; Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 352. If the
evaluation supports the court's conclusion, there will be a trial on the issue of
dangerousness. § 59-29a06; Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 352-53. The offender is entitled to
counsel, provided at the expense of the state if necessary. The trial is a full-fledged
hearing, with a right to jury and a right to counsel (provided by the state if necessary).
§ 59-29a06; Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 352-53. The standard for a determination that the
offender is a sexually violent predator is "beyond a reasonable doubt." § 59-29a07(a);
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 353. On the other hand, detention under the sexual predator
statute, unlike the detention at issue in Salerno but like the detention in Foucha, is
intended to be indefinite, possibly for life. § 59-29a07(a); Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 353. The
Court admitted: "A finding of dangerousness, standing alone, is ordinarily not a sufficient
ground upon which to justify indefinite involuntary commitment." Hendricks, 521 U.S. at
358. There must be some additional factor, such as mental illness. Id. In Foucha, there
was no mental illness, and consequently the statute in that case was struck down. 504 U.S.
71, 86 (1992).
102. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356.
103. Id.
104. See supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
105. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371.
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what he had said earlier in dissent, that the "liberty interest is not
absolute."'' 6 He remarked in particular on the right of the state to
restrain those who were dangerous because they could not control
their behavior. 7
Although the statute requires that those marked "sexual
predators" must suffer from "mental abnormalities" or "personality
disorders," it very frankly admits that "mental illness" sufficient for
civil commitment is not required.1"8 Those who are to be detained as
sexual predators do not have a mental disorder that would make it
possible to commit them under the state's civil commitment law.109
Nevertheless, the sexual predator statute passes the "additional
factor" test, although it does not require mental illness."' As we have
seen, the statute requires not only proof of dangerousness but also a
"mental abnormality" or "personality disorder." '' These statutory
requirements limit indefinite confinement, according to the Court, to
106. Id. at 356.
107. Id. at 356-57.
108. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994).
109. In the preamble to the statute the legislature says:
[A] small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators exist who
do not have a mental disease or defect that renders them appropriate for
involuntary treatment pursuant to the [general involuntary civil commitment
statute] .... In contrast to persons appropriate for civil commitment under the
[general involuntary civil commitment statute], sexually violent predators
generally have anti-social personality features which are unamenable to existing
mental illness treatment modalities and those features render them likely to
engage in sexually violent behavior. The legislature further finds that sexually
violent predators' likelihood of engaging in repeat acts of predatory sexual
violence is high. The existing involuntary commitment procedure ... is
inadequate to address the risk these sexually violent predators pose to society.
The legislature further finds that the prognosis for rehabilitating sexually violent
predators in a prison setting is poor, the treatment needs of this population are
very long term and the treatment modalities for this population are very different
than the traditional treatment modalities for people appropriate for commitment
under the [general involuntary civil commitment statute].
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 351 (omissions and alterations in original) (quoting KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 59-29a01) (1991)).
110. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358.
111. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to 59-29a07. But see Demleitner, supra note 71,
at 1657 (arguing that in Germany, "[a]t present, a finding of dangerousness might be
sufficient to meet the abnormality standard"). Demleitner notes that the German
Sicherungsverwahrung standard would be satisfied by an inclination to commit sexual
crimes, and that considerations that have been suggested as lessening responsibility, such
as "rotten social background," would seem to make the offender a good candidate for
detention under German law. Id. at 1645 n.174, 1650-51.
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those with "volitional impairment[s]," making it "difficult, if not
impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior.'
'1 12
Justice Thomas also rejected Hendricks's claim that he was
entitled to the protections that the Constitution provides for criminal
defendants."3 He remarked that the detention that Hendricks was
subject to after his commitment was not punishment, and the
proceedings that resulted in his commitment were not criminal
proceedings."4 Justice Thomas, therefore, made the same argument
that was made in Salerno: the aims of punishment are retribution and
deterrence, and commitment under the statute does not serve either
of those purposes."5 The Kansas statute is not retributive because it
is based not on past crimes, but on future dangerousness, and it is not
deterrent because sexually violent predators are not able to control
their behavior, and thus cannot be deterred.
1 6
If Salerno was the first step in expanding the modern doctrine of
preventive detention of those responsible for their behavior,
Hendricks was the second. According to Hendricks, indefinite
confinement is justified if, in addition to being dangerous, the
offender has a condition that makes it likely that he will not control
his sexual behavior." 7 The Constitution does not require a finding of
legal insanity as a basis for indefinite detention. The tendency toward
sexual crimes required by the statute is sufficient. This was not the
end of the story about the detention of sexual predators. It remained
unclear just how "inability to control," "volitional impairment," and
"likely to engage in sexually violent behavior" are related and are to
be understood. A second chapter was waiting to be told. Meanwhile,
the question of indefinite detention of undesirable aliens faced the
Court.
D. Zadvydas and the Detention of Undesirable Aliens
The issue in Zadvydas v. Davis"8 was the indefinite detention of
undesirable aliens who could not be deported to another country." 9
The problem was this: if someone were found to be an undesirable
alien subject to deportation, and the government could not find a
112. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358.
113. Id. at 360-61.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 361-62.
116. Id. at 362-63.
117. Id. at 363-64.
118. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
119. Id. at 682.
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country that would accept him, the government would have to keep
him detained until such a country could be found (and thus perhaps
indefinitely), or the government would have to release him into the
general population.12 ° The Immigration and Naturalization Service
read the relevant legislation to authorize indefinite detention under
those circumstances. 21
The Supreme Court upheld the statute, but only after
interpreting it to not permit indefinite detention.2  Justice Breyer,
speaking for the Court, emphasized the fundamental nature of the
right to freedom from physical restraint:
A statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise
a serious constitutional problem. The Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause forbids the Government to "deprive" any
''person ... of ... liberty ... without due process of law."
Freedom from imprisonment-from government custody,
detention, or other forms of physical restraint-lies at the heart
of the liberty that Clause protects. 23
Detention is permissible to prevent the most serious crimes,
where there are strict judicial safeguards and "stringent time
limitations," as in Salerno."' But indefinite detention under the
deportation statute would not be limited in time and would not be
limited to those likely to commit the most serious crimes.
Furthermore, the only procedures available to those detained under
the deportation statute are administrative procedures without judicial
review. There is a constitutional presumption against permitting
administrative tribunals to make decisions affecting fundamental
rights. 125 Furthermore, the deportation proceeding is not criminal, the
Court said: it has no punitive intent, and it has clear regulatory
120. Id.
121. Id. at 683-86.
122. Justice Breyer said that if Congress had clearly intended to make indefinite
detention possible, "we must give effect to that intent." Id. at 696 (citation omitted). But
then the statute would have to be struck down as inconsistent with due process and the
fundamental right to freedom from physical restraint. Thus, "interpreting the statute to
avoid a serious constitutional threat, we conclude that, once removal is no longer
reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute." Id. at
699.
123. Id. at 690 (alteration in original).
124. Id. at 691.
125. Id. at 692 (stating that "ft]his Court has suggested, however, that the Constitution
may well preclude granting 'an administrative body the unreviewable authority to make
determinations implicating fundamental rights' ") (quoting Superintendent, Mass. Corr.
Inst. at Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 450 (1985)).
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intent. 126 Detention is also permissible where, in addition to
dangerousness, a special justification, such as mental illness or a
tendency to commit sexual crimes, outweighs the individual's liberty
interest.127 But no such justification is available in the immigration
case.12 Indefinite detention, therefore, has no reasonable connection
to the regulatory purpose of the deportation statute.
129
The Court did mention two significant questions left undecided
by this ruling. The first was the question of admission of aliens into
the United States, rather than the ejection of undesirables. 3 The
second, more important for our story, has to do with terrorism:
"Neither do we consider terrorism or other special circumstances
where special arguments might be made for forms of preventive
detention and for heightened deference to the judgments of the
political branches with respect to matters of national security."' 3t
This observation is the basis for the use Judge Mukasey put
Zadvydas to in his opinion in Padilla, mentioned in the
introduction.
E. Crane and a Second Look at the Detention of Sexual Predators
In Kansas v. Crane133 the Supreme Court revisited the Kansas
sexual predator statute.3 The case had gone up through the Kansas
state courts. Crane had been convicted of a sex crime. 3 Whether or
not he could be confined under the statute depended on the
interpretation of the holding in Hendricks.3 6 Crane claimed that he
did not lack the ability to control his sexually violent behavior, and
therefore, was not a sexual predator under the interpretation imposed
upon the statute in Hendricks.137 The State argued that Hendricks did
not require an inability to control sexually violent behavior but only a




129. Id. at 690-91.
130. Id. at 692-93.
131. Id. at 696.
132. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
133. 534 U.S. 407 (2002).
134. Id. at 409.
135. Id. at 411.
136. Id. at 409.
137. In re Crane, 7 P.3d 285, 290 (Kan. 2000), vacated, Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407
(2002).
138. Crane, 534 U.S. at 409.
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shared Crane's understanding of Hendricks and reversed his
committal.13 9
The United States Supreme Court agreed with the State that
Hendricks had not required an absolute lack of control.14 Otherwise,
though, it agreed with Crane and the Kansas court:
We do not agree with the State ... insofar as it seeks to claim
that the Constitution permits commitment of the type of
dangerous sexual offender considered in Hendricks without any
lack-of-control determination. Hendricks underscored the
constitutional importance of distinguishing a dangerous sexual
offender subject to civil commitment "from other dangerous
persons who are perhaps more properly dealt with exclusively
through criminal proceedings." That distinction is necessary
lest "civil commitment" become a "mechanism for retribution
or general deterrence"-functions properly those of criminal
law, not civil commitment. The presence of what the
"psychiatric profession itself classifie[d] ... as a serious mental
disorder" helped to make that distinction in Hendricks. And a
critical distinguishing feature of that "serious ... disorder"
there consisted of a special and serious lack of ability to control
behavior.141
Justice Scalia was joined in dissent by Justice Thomas, who had
written the majority opinion in Hendricks.142 Scalia argued that
Hendricks had in fact interpreted the Sexually Violent Predator Act
to require, not an inability to control behavior, but rather a likelihood
that the offender would commit future acts of sexual violence.143
139. See id. at 410-11.
140. Id. at 411.
141. Id. at 412-13 (citations omitted).
142. Id. at 415 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
143. Scalia stated:
Under our holding in Hendricks, a jury in an SVPA ['Sexually Violent Predator
Act'] commitment case would be required to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, (1)
that the person previously convicted of one of the enumerated sexual offenses is
suffering from a mental abnormality or personality disorder, and (2) that this
condition renders him likely to commit future acts of sexual violence. Both of
these findings are coherent, and (with the assistance of expert testimony) well
within the capacity of a normal jury. Today's opinion says that the Constitution
requires the addition of a third finding: (3) that the subject suffers from an




The interpretation Scalia was arguing for would indeed be an
enlargement of the legislature's power to detain dangerous people.
After all, as the majority pointed out, if a likelihood of committing
violent crimes was sufficient for indefinite detention under the Act,
many in the ordinary prison population would be subject to indefinite
detention.'" If that were the test, then detention under the statute
might become a mechanism for retribution or deterrence-in other
words, for punishment under another name. 145 Under that
interpretation, indefinite detention of enemy combatants and
terrorists would indeed have to be considered constitutional. But the
Court rejected Scalia's interpretation. Indefinite detention is
permissible in the presence of an inability of a sexual predator to
control his behavior. 146 The Court acknowledged that the notion of a
lack of control presented conceptual problems, and that in particular
it overlapped with difficulties in the ability to appreciate the nature of
one's actions:
[W]e did not [in Hendricks] give to the phrase "lack of control"
a particularly narrow or technical meaning. And we recognize
that in cases where lack of control is at issue, "inability to
control behavior" will not be demonstrable with mathematical
precision. It is enough to say that there must be proof of
serious difficulty in controlling behavior. And this, when
viewed in light of such features of the case as the nature of the
psychiatric diagnosis, and the severity of the mental
abnormality itself, must be sufficient to distinguish the
dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness,
abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from
the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary
criminal case. 147
Under this decision, then, the mere existence of a personality
disorder, together with a tendency to commit sexually violent crimes,
is not sufficient to justify detention. A fortiori the mere tendency to
commit such crimes will also not be enough to justify detention.
144. Id. at 412 (majority opinion).
145. Id. at 413 (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 372-73 (1997) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
146. Id.
147. Id. (citations omitted).
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F. Hamdi, Padilla, Rasul, and the Detention of Unlawful
Combatants
Certain older cases come up repeatedly in the current discussion
of the detention of enemy combatants who are citizens: Ex parte
Milligan,'48 Moyer v. Peabody,'4 9 Ex parte Quirin,5 ° Hirabayashi v.
United States,' Korematsu v. United States.152 Of all these cases, the
only ones to rely upon a government power to detain indefinitely
without a civil or military trial are the last two, Hirabayashi and
Korematsu.153 While still on the books as good law, these two cases
have been so thoroughly discredited that reliance upon them would
be an embarrassment.
154
Nevertheless, in the recent Hamdi case (and also in the Padilla
and Rasul cases), the government asserted the right to detain enemy
combatants indefinitely without either a civil or military trial.155 In
trying to find support for the broad powers the government sought,
the federal district court in the Padilla case turned to the power
148. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
149. 212 U.S. 78 (1909).
150. 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (per curiam).
151. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
152. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
153. In Milligan, the Court rejected the use of a military tribunal, while the civil courts
were open and operating, for a civilian citizen accused of aiding the enemy. 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) at 121-22, 127. In Moyer the detention of a union leader by the Governor of
Colorado during what was labeled an "insurrection" was conceded to be temporary; it
lasted only for two and a half months. 212 U.S. at 82-85. In Quirin, the defendants,
German soldiers who arrived in the United States by way of submarine and whose mission
was sabotage, were given a military trial. 317 U.S. at 20-22. Quirin has its own problems.
It was decided hastily, affirming the right of the government to try the defendants before a
military tribunal, with a reasoned opinion handed down only after the defendants had
been executed. David J. Danelski, The Saboteur's Case, 1 J. Sup. Cr. HIST. 61, 71 (1996).
By the time of the later opinion, it was clear that not all the justices were happy with what
they had done. Id. at 79-80. Some years later Justice Frankfurter said that the Quirin
experience was "not a happy precedent." Id. at 80. Commenting on Quirin, Justice
Douglas said: "[I]t is extremely undesirable to announce a decision on the merits without
an opinion accompanying it. Because once the search for the grounds ... is made,
sometimes those grounds crumble." Id. at 77 (alteration in original) (quoting
Transcription of interviews of William 0. Douglas, by Walter F. Murphey, 204-05, Seely
G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J.).
154. See Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984)
(overturning Korematsu's conviction on the facts of the case).
In Hirabayashi v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 1445, 1447 (W.D. Wash. 1986) and
Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 608 (9th Cir. 1987), Hirabayashi's convictions
were also overturned. In 1988 Congress issued an official apology to Japanese Americans
who were detained during the war. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989a (2000).
155. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct.
2711, 2716 n.5 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2689, 2693 (2004) (stating that the
government argues that habeas only applies on American soil).
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recently carved out from Salerno through Zadvydas, and that takes us
back to the beginning of our story.'
56
One of the premises upon which the government's brief in the
Hamdi case is based was that the Congress had authorized the
President to hold these prisoners indefinitely.'57 The Constitution, of
course, authorizes Congress to suspend the writ of habeas corpus '58
for the public safety during a period of "rebellion or invasion." And
the Constitution speaks in some detail to the protections that are to
be provided to criminal defendants.' 59 But the Constitution nowhere
explicitly authorizes either the Congress or the President to suspend
the right to a criminal trial without suspending habeas corpus and to
hold people alleged to be dangerous for an indefinite period of time.
Does the Constitution implicitly permit Congress to order the
indefinite detention of those who (unlike the mentally ill) are
responsible for what they do, and who have not been convicted of a
crime or given prisoner of war status? Does it, in particular, permit
Congress to order indefinite detention in cases of "terrorism and
other special circumstances" mentioned in Zadvydas?'60 If it does
not, then it certainly doesn't permit Congress to order such detention
without a hearing, which is precisely what the government was
claiming was permitted.16' Yet none of the courts that considered the
matter in these recent cases, save the district court in the Padilla case,
questioned the assumption that Congress did have that general
power.'62 In Hamdi, it is true, the plurality asserted in dictum that
indefinite detention for interrogation had not been authorized by
Congress.' 63 But the justifying purpose of detention in these cases,
the Court said, was to keep the detainees away from the combat
zone, 164 and the fact that Congress had not authorized indefinite
detention for interrogation says nothing about whether Congress had
156. See supra Part I.A.-D.
157. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2639.
158. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
159. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; art. III, § 2, cl. 3; art. 1II, § 3, cls. 1, 2; amends. IV, V,
VI, VIII.
160. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
161. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2642-44.
162. Indeed, in Hamdi the only question of due process the Court thought worth
raising was the question of procedural due process: What sort of a hearing would be
appropriate in these circumstances? The answer to that, the Court said, was determined
by applying the balancing test laid down in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 1246-50.
163. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2641.
164. Id. at 2640. The detention in Moyer was for some three months. Moyer v.
Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 82-83 (1909).
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authorized-and more importantly for our investigation here, about
whether Congress could authorize-indefinite detention for any
purpose.
In Padilla, Judge Mukasey put the question this way: is the
"indefinite confinement of one not convicted of a crime per se
unconstitutional?" '165 He answered that question in the negative, and
he supported that answer by running briefly through the cases from
Salerno to Zadvydas, throwing in Moyer for good measure."6 But
Moyer is not about indefinite detention. The only support for the
proposition that indefinite detention is permissible comes from the
line of modern cases going back barely sixteen years.'67
The import of these cases, as we have seen, is not clear. Salerno
makes a point of the brevity of the detention at issue.168 Two of the
cases, Foucha and Zadvydas, actually reject indefinite detention, the
first for insanity acquittees who have regained their sanity, 69 the
second for undesirable aliens. 7 ' The only case to authorize indefinite
detention under the Salerno reasoning is Hendricks, and the message
of Hendricks was clarified in Crane to apply only where there is
sufficient mental abnormality to call the detainee's responsibility and
control into question. 171 Zadvydas left open the question of the
indefinite detention of terrorists.172
Given all that, it seems to me that there is plenty of room left to
reach the conclusion that Congress does not have the power to order
the indefinite detention of those who are responsible for what they do
and who have not been convicted of any crime. In the next Part of
the Article I will argue for that conclusion on moral and political
grounds, and in the third Part of the Article, I will argue that that
conclusion is consistent with Supreme Court precedent.
II. JUSTIFYING INDEFINITE DETENTION
One way of looking at what the Court did in Hendricks and
Crane was that it drew the following line: no one who understands
what he is doing may be indefinitely detained unless he is
165. Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 591 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), affid in
part, rev'd in part sub nom. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd, 542
U.S. 426,124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
166. Id.
167. See supra Parts I.A.-I.E.
168. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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substantially unable to control his behavior. That seems like a
plausible rule, but it has given rise to a great deal of controversy.'
To understand why, we have to know something about the recent
history of the theory of criminal responsibility.
A. The Return of the Man Who Could Not Control His Behavior
When are we entitled to give up on deterrence and resort to
physical restraint to prevent future harm? One traditional answer is:
in cases of insanity. If a severe mental disorder that satisfies the legal
definition of insanity can be established, we abandon punishment and
choose commitment. 174 Both punishment and the threat of
punishment are ineffective, and where the individual presents a
serious danger, only indefinite detention can be counted on to satisfy
the state's obligation to prevent harm. 75 Moreover, the person whose
criminal act is due to his insanity does not deserve punishment, even
though he may have to be detained indefinitely for the protection of
society. About these things there is very little controversy.
176
But although there is not much controversy about the
relationship between insanity, punishment, and indefinite detention,
there has been a great deal of controversy about just what constitutes
legal insanity. The traditional discussion contemplates two different
sorts of disability stemming from mental illness: a disability that
interferes with understanding and appreciation of the consequences
of one's actions, as may happen, for example, in schizophrenia, and a
disability that interferes with control over behavior, as may happen
173. See infra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
174. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 161 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970).
175. This observation is not based on utilitarian reasoning, though it is based on a kind
of consequentialism. Bentham argued that punishment of those who could not be
deterred was pointless. See id. Hart made the obvious ad hominem criticism that it might
promote welfare nevertheless to punish the insane and others because of the deterrent
effect it would have on others. See H.L.A. Hart, Prolegomenon to the Principles of
Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 1, 19 (1st ed. 1968). I believe, as many
others do, that utilitarianism has been completely discredited as a theory of punishment.
The point I am making here is that if punishment has any justification at all, it cannot be
based upon the deterrence of others, but it must be based upon the effect punishment has
on the person punished. Hence if it can have no effect on that person, it is pointless. For a
criticism of both utilitarianism and retributivism, see Michael Corrado, Abolition of
Punishment, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 257, 262-70 (2001).
176. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1985). To say that there is very little
controversy is not to say there is none. A small number of states have abolished the
insanity defense. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-207(1) (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3220
(1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (2003).
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with compulsive disorders.'77 In the latter years of the twentieth
century, the second sort of disability, the control or volitional
disability, was subjected to vigorous criticism, and the idea that a
rational actor might lack control over his behavior aroused strong
opposition, both theoretical and political. 78 The theoretical argument
was, first, that the very idea of someone who acted intentionally and
yet whose act was not in his control did not make sense: to act
intentionally was to will the act; to will the act was to act voluntarily;
to act voluntarily was to be in control. 79  That argument was
bolstered by a second argument, to the effect that even if there were
cases in which a rational agent couldn't control his behavior, it was
impossible to distinguish between those who couldn't and those who
wouldn't control their behavior. 180
Both arguments were unsound, 18 but they were tremendously
influential, supported as they were by political sentiment from the left
and right. Indeed, in the 1980s, the man who could not adequately
control his behavior and who had great difficulty in conforming his
behavior to the law was well on his way to becoming the Invisible
Man of American law. In the years between 1980 and 2000, the
number of states that recognized the second element of responsibility,
177. 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 49 (1998) (discussing the theory underlying the
principle of the insanity defense).
178. The attack on the control element was just part of a general attack on the insanity
defense:
During the last ten years, interest in abolishing or modifying the insanity defense
has been renewed because of several factors. Public officials, speaking for a
growing conservative consensus and a public understandably disturbed by the
failures of the entire criminal justice system, have championed the cause that the
insanity defense is one more indication that the country is "soft on crime."
Insanity Defense Work Group, American Psychiatric Association, Statement on the
Insanity Defense, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 681, 682 (1983).
179. See, e.g., Michael Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1128-
48 (1985) (identifying volition with control); Stephen Morse, Culpability and Control, 142
U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1593-94 (1994) (same).
180. See Insanity Defense Work Group, supra note 178, at 685. This is the source of
the quote, repeated frequently and often mindlessly in the literature, to the effect that
"[t]he line between an irresistible impulse and an impulse not resisted is probably no
sharper than that between twilight and dusk." This comes in the face of studies showing
that in some cases the line is very clear indeed. See, e.g., Committee on Addictions of the
Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, Responsibility and Choice in Addiction, 53
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 707, 708-09 (2002) (discussing biological and psychological
studies of addiction).




the control element, decreased.1" Where in 1980 thirty states had
recognized both the cognitive and the control elements of the insanity
defense, now only fifteen do.183 The remaining states either recognize
only a cognitive element or provide no insanity defense whatsoever.
84
Sympathy for an addiction defense went the same way, for the same
reasons. 85 The basis for an addiction defense is the claim that the
addict cannot fully control his addictive behavior. If control
difficulties make no sense, then neither does an addiction defense.
186
But although he has been losing his role in the insanity defense
and other excuses, the man who cannot adequately control his actions
is no longer invisible. He has reappeared in the sexual predator
legislation (and other arenas), 1 7 where he can be both punished and
182. See Jodie English, The Light Between Twilight and Dusk: Federal Criminal Law
and the Volitional Insanity Defense, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 45 (1988); Christine
Michalopoulos, Comment, Filling in the Holes of the Insanity Defense: The Andrea Yates
Case and the Need for a New Prong, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 383, 389 (2003).
183. The fifteen are: Arkansas, Connecticut, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-312 (1997 & Supp. 2005);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-13 (West 2001); HAW. REV. STAT. § 704-400 (1993); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.020 (LexisNexis 1999); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PRO. § 3-109
(LexisNexis 2001); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 768.21a(1) (West 2000); N.M. STAT. § 31-
9-3 (2000); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.295 (1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4801 (1998); WiS.
STAT. ANN. § 971.15 (West 1998); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-11-304 (2005); Commonwealth v.
McHoul, 226 N.E.2d 556, 557 (Mass. 1967); State v. Johnson, 399 A.2d 469, 476 (R.I.
1979); Price v. Commonwealth, 323 S.E.2d 106, 109 (Va. 1984); State v. Nuckolls, 273
S.E.2d 87,89 (W. Va. 1980).
184. Under New Hampshire law there is no test for insanity; the defendant's sanity is a
question of fact just like any other fact for the jury to consider. See State v. Abbott, 503
A.2d 791, 794 (N.H. 1985); State v. Sadvari, 462 A.2d 102, 104-05 (N.H. 1983); see also
supra note 103.
185. See United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (rejecting
common law defense of addiction). See generally Michael Corrado, Addiction and
Responsibility: An Introduction, 18 LAW & PHIL. 579 (1999) (outlining questions of
addiction and responsibility).
186. See Michael Corrado, Addiction and Causation, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 913, 929-
35 (2000).
187. I am thinking here of the guilty-but-mentally-ill ("GBMI") verdict available in a
number of states. This verdict often results, just as with the sexual predator legislation, in
punishment followed by indefinite detention. In some states the basis for the GBMI
verdict is a compulsive or control disorder. For example, it is the law in Delaware that:
Where the trier of fact determines that, at the time of the conduct charged, a
defendant suffered from a psychiatric disorder which substantially disturbed such
person's thinking, feeling or behavior and/or that such psychiatric disorder left
such person with insufficient willpower to choose whether the person would do the
act or refrain from doing it, although physically capable, the trier of fact shall
return a verdict of "guilty, but mentally ill."
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 401(b) (2001).
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then preventively detained. His reappearance has elicited two very
different responses from those who wanted him gone. One response
is this: since the man who cannot control his behavior doesn't exist
(or at least cannot be detected if he does exist), the sexual predator
legislation is a mistake.'88 The sexual offender's acts are intentional,
and therefore, he is in control.'89 If he is capable of understanding
what he is doing (that is, if he is not legally insane), he should be
punished and not detained. 9 ° Another response is this: although the
man who cannot control his behavior may not exist, the man who will
not control his behavior certainly does, and detention of the sort
provided for in the sexual predator legislation may be appropriate for
those who will not conform to the law-including terrorists. 191
I have argued elsewhere that the underlying premise shared by
these two arguments, the premise that there is no distinction to be
made between the person who cannot conform to the law and the
person who will not conform to the law, is false.192 But even if I am
right and that premise is false, it doesn't follow that the conclusions
that they reach must be rejected. For even if there are rational
people who cannot control their behavior, or who experience
unreasonable difficulty in trying to conform their behavior to the law
(to avoid sexually violent behavior, for example), it might still be
appropriate to punish such people when they do break the law, rather
than detaining them indefinitely. Or, on the other hand, it might be
the case that their lack of control is not a defining factor with legal
significance, and that anyone who refuses to be deterred by the threat
of punishment should be subject to indefinite detention. But
although I do not think the falsity of these conclusions follows from
the falsity of the premise, these conclusions are false nevertheless.
In South Carolina:
A defendant is guilty but mentally ill if, at the time of the commission of the act
constituting the offense, he had the capacity to distinguish right from wrong or to
recognize his act as being wrong ... , but because of mental disease or defect he
lacked sufficient capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-20(A) (2003). Other states distinguish this verdict from the
NGRI verdict by the lesser degree of disability required. In jurisdictions where the only
legal basis for an insanity acquittal is cognitive disability, that means that individuals with
recognized compulsive disorders will end up guilty but mentally ill. See ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/6-2(c) (West 2002).
188. See Stephen Morse, Fear of Danger, Flight from Culpability, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 250,258 (1998).
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See Slobogin, supra note 26, passim.
192. See infra Part II.C.
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Starting from the assumption that the man who cannot control his
behavior does exist, I will argue first that if he creates a serious
danger to the community he should be detained and not punished. I
will then argue that such detention should be limited to those who
cannot control their behavior.
B. Punishing the Man Who Could Not Control His Behavior
If we start from the premises that it is possible for a person who
understands what he is doing to nevertheless lack control, and that it
is possible to distinguish that person from one who simply refuses to
comply, then the first position to be considered is that those who find
it difficult to control their behavior should be punished and not
indefinitely detained. It is difficult to understand why that should be
so. Assuming that punishment cannot be fully justified in terms of
making an example for others,193 in the case of the offender who
cannot control his behavior, punishment is a pointless infliction of
pain. 94 He cannot mend his ways. And so where serious crimes are
an issue, detention (and rehabilitation where possible) seems the only
alternative. If the only thing in favor of punishing and not detaining
those with control difficulties was the flimsy argument against the
possibility of control difficulties, it would be difficult to see why that
position has attracted the support it has.195
The real force of the argument against detention is in its
humanitarian appeal, and it is easiest to understand its bite when
speaking about addiction. To treat the compulsive or the addict as
undeterrable, to deny him his responsibility for his actions, it is
argued, is to treat him as a machine and to condemn him to the
misery of a rehabilitative repair shop for an indefinite period of time,
perhaps for the rest of his life. 196 The message to the addict is that he
cannot free himself from his addiction. In other words, the denial of
responsibility is self-fulfilling. Someone who is told that he is not
responsible for the mess he is in and who is treated like someone who
is not responsible will lose his will to take responsibility. Paternalism
makes children of us. The addict and anyone suffering from
compulsive difficulties are entitled to the respect that is implicit in the
threat of punishment: "You are capable of handling your own affairs,
and since you are, you will be held accountable and punished if you
193. See supra note 175.
194. I assume as well that punishment cannot be justified in terms of retribution.
195. See Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58
S. CAL. L. REV. 779, 815-16 (1985).
196. See Slobogin, supra note 26, at 27.
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handle them in such a way as to harm others." In other words, we
want to salvage responsibility where possible, and we cannot do that
by treating people as if they are not responsible.
The argument has a lofty tone, but it falls apart under analysis. It
is true that the person suffering from a compulsive disorder has a
certain amount of control over his life and a certain amount of
responsibility for what is happening to him. The addict could, to
begin with, have avoided taking the drug that has become his
addiction. And now that he is addicted, he could voluntarily enter a
rehabilitation program. That is something that remains within his
control, so that he may be threatened with punishment if he fails to
enter such a program. (And the compulsive sex offender could
voluntarily have sought psychological rehabilitation.) But avoiding
taking the drug the first time is not what is at issue here and neither is
entering a rehabilitation program. If in fact there is social harm in the
taking of certain drugs, then those who are not yet addicted but take
those drugs can be punished for it. Moreover, even the addict or the
compulsive offender can be required to seek rehabilitation under
threat of punishment. The question is whether society can best be
protected from the dangers presented by a person suffering from a
compulsive disorder by holding him responsible for the compulsive
behavior itself (rather than for becoming compulsive or for failing to
seek rehabilitation) and by punishing the symptoms of the
compulsion. The question is whether he can be held responsible for
his compulsive behavior itself and whether it serves any purpose to
threaten him with punishment if he engages in it. And it seems
perfectly clear that it serves no purpose whatsoever. Neither the
threat of punishment, nor punishment itself, works very well in
preventing the addict or compulsive offender from engaging in his
addictive or compulsive behavior. Indeed, punishment without
treatment-which is really what is called for by this point of view-is
the truly inhumane response to addiction or any other control
disorder.
Of course, detention is not always the appropriate response
either. What may be appropriate for a compulsive sex offender,
whose crimes threaten harm to others, need not be appropriate for an
addict whose crimes are the much less serious crimes of possession
and use. While detention may be called for in some cases, in others
clinical treatment may be enough, and in some no intervention at all
may be appropriate. Some crimes associated with addictive
substances may be violent crimes, and of course they may be
punished, just as failure to enter rehabilitation may be punished. But
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the proper response to crimes involving simple addictive behavior is
generally either a paternalistic response, or no response at all. It does
not demean the addict to be required to undergo treatment any more
than it demeans the person with a communicable disease to be
quarantined. If the taking of addictive drugs is a threat to society-
and it is difficult to know whether the taking of the drugs or their
prohibition is a greater threat to the peace-then the community is
entitled to take action to prevent it. And that action may include the
involuntary treatment of addicts.
All of this can be applied to the compulsive sex offender. If in
fact there are offenders who genuinely find great difficulty in
controlling their criminal behavior, then the warnings against
paternalism are misdirected. The state has an obligation to protect,
and if we are dealing with people who cannot control their behavior,
neither the threat of punishment, nor punishment itself, are going to
have any effect. The question of course is whether there are sex
offenders who cannot control their behavior, but once we have put
aside the theoretical arguments against the possibility of such a
disability, we must rely on the judgment of those whose business it is
to determine these things: psychiatrists, psychologists, and other
behavioral scientists. It makes no sense to close our eyes to the
problem and insist on punishing those who cannot benefit from the
punishment.
And so it would seem that the Supreme Court is right to permit
indefinite detention of those violent offenders who cannot control
their behavior. Where it has gone wrong is in permitting the
punishment of such people before they are committed for detention.
If we are willing to recognize the man who cannot control his
behavior, the arguments against according him a responsibility
defense fall flat. There is a very clear position here: if punishment is
pointless, then it is inhumane to punish. What now needs to be
shown is the converse: where a person can control his behavior,
detention is inappropriate.
C. Detaining the Man Who Can Control His Behavior
The question of enemy combatants raises the general issue of the
offender who can control his behavior. If we are justified in detaining
those who cannot control their behavior, why not those who can but
choose not to? That is, why not detain anyone who is undeterrable
and who threatens serious harm? For example, why isn't indefinite
detention appropriate for the terrorist or the unlawful combatant?
The suicide bomber is the paradigm example of an undeterrable
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person. If his prospective death will not stop the bomber, why would
the threat of punishment? Certainly he is undeterrable if anyone is,
even though we may assume that he is not suffering from a cognitive
defect that would mean legal insanity, or from an inability to control
his behavior. Why not simply detain him indefinitely until it can be
established that he is no longer dangerous? There are three sorts of
problems with this position.
The first problem is that if we are willing to detain those who
will not conform to the law, it is impossible to know where to draw
the line between those who should be detained and those who should
be punished. If we do not accept the difference between those who
cannot conform to the law and those who will not conform to the law,
it becomes difficult to see where the line between punishment and
detention should be drawn. How are we to decide who cannot be
deterred, in the sense that would justify indefinite detention? The
problem is to define the locution "will not be deterred" or "will not
conform to the law" in such a way as to yield a clear line between
those who may be detained and those who may not. Every criminal
takes a chance that he will be apprehended and punished. How great
must the chance be before he moves from the category of the
punishable and into the category of the detainable? The punishments
that are risked by criminals are sometimes very substantial indeed. In
those cases, how great must the risk be before it is significant? Using
the standards of the criminal law, we would have to say that causing a
twenty percent chance of death or of life imprisonment would be
more than reckless, it would be something close to depraved-heart
indifference. Is that a great enough risk to permit us to identify
someone as undeterrable? Should every criminal who is willing to
risk a twenty percent chance of apprehension and conviction be
subject to indefinite detention? 197 The problem is not so much
coming up with the right figures as it is explaining why those a bit on
one side of the line should be subject to punishment only, while those
a bit on the other side should be subject to indefinite detention.
Whatever it is that distinguishes the punishable from the detainable,
it can't be something that fades and disappears as the actor's
tolerance for risk edges up a bit.
The second problem is that giving the state the power to detain
those who simply will not obey the law opens the way to serious
197. And what should we say about the person who, when provoked severely enough,
will disregard a high risk of punishment? The criminal justice system that we have
mitigates his punishment. Should he be indefinitely detained instead? Detained only
when he is provoked?
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abuse. Suppose that judges have the option of preventively detaining
anyone who cannot be deterred by a significant threat of substantial
punishment. A member of a minority political party who has access
to certain classified documents makes them available to a newspaper.
He is aware of the penalty that goes with revealing classified
information and is willing to pay that price. The government argues
that revealing the information he has revealed is a serious threat to
national security, and will give aid and comfort to an enemy.198 It
argues that the offender has additional knowledge which could cause
even more damage if revealed. It asks for preventive detention on
the ground that the accused is dangerous, that the danger he is
capable of creating is great, and that he obviously is not deterred by
the threat of punishment. This possibility brings to mind the example
of Mordecai Vanunu, the Israeli nuclear technician recently released
from prison. 199 He served eighteen years, twelve in solitary
confinement, for disclosing information about Israel's nuclear
program; Israel now declines to allow him to leave the country or to
talk to the press for a period of time, a deprivation of liberty less
onerous than but similar to preventive detention.2"
The third problem, having to do with the case of unlawful
combatants in particular, is that none of the arguments for preventive
detention are convincing in that case. There might indeed be a
serious threat to the community in what the protestor has done, and
perhaps he is capable of causing even greater harm. The problem
here is that putting the power to detain indefinitely in the
government's hands creates a conflict of interest. The question will
always be whether the government is detaining the individual because
he is a threat to the community or because he is a threat to the
government, which of course is not the same thing. Where the
government has the option of silencing those who protest by imposing
indefinite detention upon them, at the same time creating an example
for other protestors, the consequences are likely to be unfortunate.0 1
198. It is important to keep in mind that the security of the state is considered even
more important than human life. Treason, not murder, is the most serious of crimes. See
Hanauer v. Doane, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 342, 347 (1871) ("No crime is greater than
treason."). Perhaps a modern justification for the rule would be that when the survival of
the state is threatened, the security of all is threatened.
199. Reuters, Israeli Nuclear Whistleblower Released, ABC NEWS ONLINE, Apr. 21,
2004, http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/s1092096.htm.
200. Id.
201. Cesare Beccaria has some interesting things to say about the relative seriousness
of crimes:
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We are concerned here not only with individual invasions of liberty
but with the effects of a practice, the practice of pure preventive
detention. Even if the most rigorous effort is made to use detention
only in the most serious cases, there will be a chilling effect at the
essentially amorphous border between the serious and the not-so-
serious. This is another reason, if one is needed, for not permitting
preventive detention of those who can control their behavior but for
political or moral reasons refuse to do so and who threaten to commit
crimes. Whether the crime threatened is minor or serious, what we
want is a relatively bright line, and I do not think that a bright line can
be drawn around the class of those who are unwilling to obey the law.
The state's power to punish, of course, is subject to the same sort of
abuse and the same sort of ambiguity. That is precisely why it is
girded about with so many constitutional protections, all of which fall
away when we deal with regulatory detention.
Indefinite detention is sometimes called for, but we can and
should make what we can of the notion of a lack of control, as the
Court did in Hendricks22 and Crane.2°3 Those who cannot control
their behavior, like those who cannot understand or appreciate the
consequences of their behavior, are both harder to deter and less
deserving of punishment. Those who are able but unwilling to
conform may be harder to deter, but they are deserving of
punishment. Given the difficulty of drawing the line and the danger
of abuse, those who are able but unwilling to conform, like the
terrorist but also like the recidivist felon and the conscientious
objector, should be punished and not preventively detained.2°
D. Detaining Enemy Combatants
We have been talking so far about offenders against whom
punishment is not effective because they cannot or will not be
The first class of crimes, which are the gravest because most injurious, are those
known as crimes of lese majesty [high treason]. Only tyranny and ignorance,
confounding the clearest terms and ideas, can apply this name and consequently
the gravest punishment, to crimes of a different nature, thereby making men, on
this as on a thousand other occasions, victims of a word. Every crime, even of a
private nature, injures society, but it is not every crime that aims at its immediate
destruction.
CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 68 (Henry Paolucci trans., Bobbs-
Merrill 1963) (1764).
202. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357 (1997).
203. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407,409 (2002).
204. See supra notes 198-201.
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deterred. There is an additional consideration in the case of citizens
who turn up as enemy combatants, whether ordinary prisoners of war,
illegal combatants, war criminals, or terrorists. The argument that is
made for detention in this case is that punishment is not effective for
another reason, namely that where the courts are not operating or are
not close at hand, and where justice must be administered by military
commanders, the threat of punishment cannot be effective.2 °5 Those
who are captured, either soldiers who become prisoners of war or
others who violate the rules of battle, will know that there is little
chance that they can be tried on the spot. If the only alternative is to
release them, they will be immune from punishment. Under such
circumstances preventive detention seems unavoidable:
[T]he detention of enemy combatants serves at least two vital
purposes. First, detention prevents enemy combatants from
rejoining the enemy and continuing to fight against America
and its allies .... Second, detention in lieu of prosecution may
relieve the burden on military commanders of litigating the
circumstances of a capture halfway around the globe .... As
the Supreme Court has recognized, "[i]t would be difficult to
devise more effective fettering of a field commander than to
allow the very enemies he is ordered to reduce to submission to
call him to account in his own civil courts and divert his efforts
and attention from the military offensive abroad to the legal
defensive at home.
''206
This argument does justify temporary detention, just as the
inability of the police to conduct on-the-spot criminal trials justifies
the apprehension and temporary detention of criminal suspects. But
war does not make a good case for indefinite preventive detention. It
would be hard to make the point that in wartime the threat of
punishment is permanently ineffective. For the justification for
detention lasts not as long as the war lasts, but only as long as the
conditions that justify the detention last. As long as those conditions
last, as long as military commanders cannot be distracted to conduct
205. See infra notes 206-07 and accompanying text.
206. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 465-66 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original)
(quoting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 779 (1950)), vacated, 542 U.S. 507, 124 S.
Ct. 2633 (2004); see also Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 125-27 (1866) (concerning
the imposition of martial law and detention under the threat of civil war or invasion); see
Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 465-66 (discussing preventing enemy combatants from fighting against
the country and difficulties in litigation as the two main reasons for detention of enemy
combatants); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2640, 2647-48 (2004) (discussing the
need to detain enemy combatants in wartime and the difficulties of litigation in wartime).
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criminal trials of prisoners who, if released, would return to support
the enemy, the cursory sort of hearing required by the Supreme Court
in Hamdi will have to do.207 But once those conditions disappear and
the justification for such treatment fades, those accused of crimes
must be entitled to a trial and either convicted or released. For
example, once camps for prisoners of war have been organized and
staffed there should no longer be any excuse for failing to try those
suspected of crimes, either in military or civilian courts. The rationale
simply collapses.
It is important to emphasize that the only rationale for detention
recognized by the courts in these cases has to do with the difficulty of
conducting trials in wartime and the danger of releasing combatants
to return to enemy lines. Prisoners of war will return to enemy lines
if released, and so they should not be released until the war ends. But
the one suspected of crimes will not return to enemy lines if tried. If
he is tried and found not guilty and was in fact a combatant, he may
continue to be held as a prisoner of war. There is simply nothing in
all this to challenge the call for a per se ban on the indefinite
detention of those who are in control of their behavior and are not
convicted of crimes.
Thus, indefinite preventive detention should be available, at
most, in those cases in which the offenders cannot be deterred: cases
involving the legally insane; cases involving those suffering from
serious and extremely contagious diseases, where the control of the
spread of the disease is not within the detainees' control; and perhaps
cases involving sexual predators, if in particular cases sexual
predators are unable to control their behavior. But the list of those
who are detainable does not include those captured in battle, either
on the ground that they will not be deterred by the threat of
punishment, or on the ground that the threat of punishment cannot
be implemented in wartime.
The next question is whether these principles are consistent with
Supreme Court jurisprudence on the matter, or whether Judge
Mukasey is right and Congress may constitutionally authorize
indefinite detention for enemy combatants. 28
207. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2651-52.
208. See Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 591 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), affd
in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd, 542
U.S. 426, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).
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III. CAN INDEFINITE DETENTION (OF ENEMY COMBATANTS) BE
BANNED?
Indefinite detention on grounds of dangerousness, then, is
permissible at most where the threat of punishment cannot be
effective. That is, where it can be established to some degree of
certainty that the dangerous person cannot respond to the threat of
punishment either because she does not understand what she does, or
because she is not in control of her behavior. It is not morally
permissible to authorize indefinite detention in any and all cases that
arouse public anxiety, and in particular, it is not permissible in the
case of combatants captured in time of war, whether they are simply
prisoners of war or can also be accused of having committed crimes.
A brief survey of the cases will make clear that, in fact, this limiting
principle is indeed consistent with the cases.
Salerno, of course, was the opening move in this series of cases. °9
But one of the very features that made preventive detention easier to
take in that case disqualifies it as precedent for indefinite detention.
The detention was limited in duration.210 It was designed for, and
could only last for, the pretrial period: "The arrestee is entitled to a
prompt detention hearing, and the maximum length of pretrial
detention is limited by the stringent time limitations of the Speedy
Trial Act. ' 211  Nothing whatever about the case suggests that
Congress could have ordered indefinite detention on the basis of
future dangerousness. But the possibility of indefinite detention did
come up in the Foucha case.212
When the Court took Foucha, Salerno was still fresh.213 It was
open to the Court at that point to extend the holding of the earlier
case, and to find that the Louisiana statute was about regulation and
not about punishment, and so was constitutionally valid. Instead the
Court held that the indefinite scope of the detention turned it into
punishment. As the Court said, since the detainee had not been
convicted of a crime, he could not be punished.214 It struck down the
statute. We might object to the way the Court went about reaching
the conclusion, treating the detention as punishment. Even though
the detention was to be indefinite, that did not make it punishment,
209. See discussion supra Part I.A.
210. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987).
211. Id.
212. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 85 (1992); see discussion supra Part I.B.
213. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 81 (distinguishing Salerno because it involved pretrial
detention).
214. Id. at 80.
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and if it did, that would not be enough to justify the conclusion.
Definitions and aphorisms cannot decide questions of this sort.
The better way to put what the Court did is this: it distinguished
the detention of the mentally ill from the detention of those who are
legally sane. 15 While Foucha was mentally ill, his indefinite detention
was justified. When he became legally sane, holding him was not
justified unless as punishment, and then only if Foucha had been
convicted of a crime. Foucha was not a candidate for continued
preventive detention. There was no reason to think that
henceforward his behavior could not be effectively (though of course
not absolutely) controlled by the threat of punishment.
However, the next case in the series, Hendricks, called that
conclusion into question. 16 If those who are legally sane cannot be
indefinitely detained to prevent future acts of violence, then the
Kansas statute, which at one and the same time declared that sexual
predators were not insane and provided for their indefinite detention,
should also be held unconstitutional.217 But the Court went the other
way in Hendricks and upheld the detention. 18 It is clear enough why
the Court decided as it did. Public distress would have turned to
outrage if the Court had concluded that the state could not keep
pedophiles and other violent sexual predators off the streets
indefinitely. To have limited their detention to the period provided
for in criminal statutes would simply have been very difficult for the
Court. On the other hand, to declare that the "mental abnormalities"
required by the statute deprived sexual predators of responsibility for
their actions and placed them beyond the criminal law would also
have provoked outrage.219 Very few were willing to come to the
defense of such criminals. They were indeed the "the vile and the
worthless" of Representative Randolph's speech, 220 and they
smoothed the way for the first indefinite detention of sane individuals
ever explicitly approved by the Court for the purpose of preventing
future harm.
It is true that for the most part those detained under the Kansas
statute are persons who have been convicted of a crime, but by the
time their detention begins, they will have served their criminal
sentences, and under other circumstances would be entitled to go
215. See supra Part I.B.
216. See supra Part I.C.
217. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997).
218. Id. at 371.
219. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (1994).
220. 16 ANNALS OF CONG. 538 (1807); see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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free. Their continued confinement is not based on what they have
done but on what they might do in the future. It is pure preventive
detention, and it is for an indefinite period of time. Had Foucha been
decided immediately after Hendricks, it might have come out
differently. In fact, after Hendricks it was not entirely clear how
much of Foucha was left standing.
Crane helped to clarify the picture.22t The very issue in Crane
was to come to an understanding of what Hendricks had said.222 One
possibility was to read Hendricks as giving a very broad scope to the
Kansas statute. If the requirement of a "mental abnormality or
personality disorder" was satisfied by any "condition," whether
genetic or acquired, which to a high degree "predisposes the person
to commit sexually violent offenses," 23 then the requirement could be
satisfied by almost any recidivist. The person who reoffends to "a
degree constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of
others" has a condition-that is, a tendency to reoffend-that "makes
the person likely to engage in the predatory acts of sexual
violence." '224 Justice Scalia, for example, appears to have read
Hendricks in that way in his dissent in Crane.225
Another way to read Hendricks was as requiring a condition that
resulted in a serious difficulty in controlling behavior, that is, a
serious difficulty in refraining from committing crimes of a sexual
nature. Hendricks had admitted that he had difficulties of that sort.226
Crane denied that he did.227 The statute itself said nothing of the sort;
221. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002); see supra Part I.E.




Under our holding in Hendricks, a jury in an SVPA commitment case would be
required to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, (1) that the person previously
convicted of one of the enumerated sexual offenses is suffering from a mental
abnormality or personality disorder, and (2) that this condition renders him likely
to commit future acts of sexual violence. Both of these findings are coherent, and
(with the assistance of expert testimony) well within the capacity of a normal jury.
Today's opinion says that the Constitution requires the addition of a third finding:
(3) that the subject suffers from an inability to control behavior-not utter
inability, and not even inability in a particular constant degree, but rather inability
in a degree that will vary in light of such features of the case as the nature of the
psychiatric diagnosis, and the severity of the mental abnormality itself.
Crane, 534 U.S. at 422-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Justice Thomas, who
wrote the opinion in the Hendricks case, joined in Scalia's dissent. Id. at 415.
226. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360 (1997).
227. Crane, 534 U.S. at 411, 414.
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it only required a likelihood that the offender would engage in
predatory acts. But the Hendricks opinion had plenty of language
suggesting that the only way the statute could be found constitutional
would be to read such a requirement into it. And that is the way the
majority in Crane understood it.
228
Under Crane, then, the sexual predator need not be insane to be
indefinitely detained. But he must be unable to control, or at least
must experience difficulty in controlling, his predatory behavior.229
Although this lack of control does not constitute insanity in Kansas
and many other states, it fits nicely with the principle we are working
with here. The person who cannot control his violent sexual behavior
presents an unacceptable risk of causing serious harm, a risk that
cannot be held within acceptable levels by the threat of punishment.
To say that he cannot control his behavior is tantamount to saying
that the threat of punishment cannot work.23
Zadvydas,31 like Foucha and Crane, cut back on the state's
power to detain.232 Judge Mukasey, who wrote the district court
opinion in the Padilla case, and whose point was to show that there
was no constitutional ban on the indefinite detention of enemy
combatants, distinguished Zadvydas:
The Court recently raised constitutional doubts as to the
permissible length of preventive detention when it considered a
case involving aliens awaiting deportation, and therefore, read
the governing statute to limit such detention to the time
reasonably necessary to secure the alien's removal, with six
months presumed as a reasonable limit. However, even while
doing so, the Court was careful to point out that the case before
it did not involve "terrorism or other special circumstances
where special arguments might be made for forms of preventive
detention and for heightened deference to the judgments of the
political branches with respect to matters of national
security. "233
228. See id. at 412-13 (discussing the constitutional impact of Hendricks).
229. Id. at 413.
230. I have already suggested that the state's right to detain such individuals
indefinitely ought to be inconsistent with the right to punish them. See supra note 175 and
accompanying text. But on that point, the sexual predator cases point in a different
direction.
231. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
232. See supra Part I.D.
233. Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 591 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352
F.3d 695, 724 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd, 542 U.S. 426, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).
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The proper conclusion to draw from this, however, is only that
Zadvydas did not prohibit indefinite detention of terrorists-which it
could not have, in any case, since that issue was not before the
Court.2" Zadvydas does not rule out indefinite detention, but neither
does it support it. The one thing it does support is the conclusion that
undesirable aliens cannot be indefinitely detained.235 We may
understand that holding to be limited to cases where the behavior of
such a person can be controlled by the threat of punishment, for it is
clear that if he were found to be a sexual predator and unable to
control his violent sexual behavior, or if he were acquitted of a
criminal charge by reason of insanity, he would be a legitimate
candidate for indefinite detention.
On the whole, then, the balance of precedent before Hamdi
would seem to be against indefinite detention of anyone who retains
his sanity and control over his behavior. At the same time, as
Zadvydas makes clear, it is open to the Court to treat terrorism as a
special circumstance.236 The Hamdi opinion itself is not as clear as we
might have hoped.237 It did not rule out indefinite detention without
conviction for a crime but neither did it explicitly affirm it. The Court
addressed itself primarily to the question of procedural due process.238
If the Court had asked how long an enemy combatant may be held
without trial, its answer would have been the answer to our question.
If the Court had held that an enemy combatant could not be detained
indefinitely without trial, then (since those who are tried and
acquitted continue to be entitled to their freedom) those not
convicted of a crime could not be held indefinitely. But that is not the
question the Court set for itself. It asked, rather, how long an enemy
combatant might be held without process.23 9 The Court decided that
Hamdi could not be held indefinitely without process, but the process
the Court required, as we have seen, was minimal, and did not
amount to a trial.24°
Beyond that the Court said only that Congress had not in fact
authorized detention beyond the end of the Afghanistan war.241 The
Court's discussion of the meaning of indefinite detention suggests
234. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696.
235. See id. at 699 (holding that once removal is not reasonably foreseeable, detention
is not authorized by statute).
236. See id. at 682.
237. See supra notes 155-64 and accompanying text.
238. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2646-50 (2004).
239. Id. at 2635.
240. See id. at 2648.
241. Id. at 2641-42.
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that the Court did not believe that Congress had in fact authorized
indefinite detention, or that detention for the duration of the
Afghanistan war was indefinite detention.24 It noted that the war on
terror might last "for two generations" '243 and declared that for
practical purposes that would be indefinite detention. It then decided
that the detention could not last for the duration of the war on terror,
but only for the duration of the war in Afghanistan.2" As to whether,
if the war in Afghanistan were to go on for a very long time, the
congressional authorization would permit detention for the full length
of the war, the Court seems to have left that an open question:
[W]e understand Congress' grant of authority ... to include the
authority to detain for the duration of the relevant conflict, and
our understanding is based on longstanding law-of-war
principles. If the practical circumstances of a given conflict are
entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed the
development of the law of war, that understanding may
unravel. But that is not the situation we face as of this date.245
The opinion is not exactly clear about the point, but it is at least
arguable that the Court believed that Congress did not, in the
AUMF, authorize indefinite detention. What is clear, I think, is that
the Court either believed that Congress had not authorized indefinite
detention, or did not explicitly address the question at all.
The Court did say, as Dworkin points out, that "indefinite
detention for the purpose of interrogation is not authorized.
' 246
There are three reasons why that may say nothing at all about the
answer to our question. The first is that the Court might have meant
that indefinite detention without process is not authorized for the
purpose of interrogation, which seems very likely in the
circumstances. Second, even if the claim was a substantive one-
whether or not there is process, indefinite detention for the purpose
of interrogation is not authorized-the Court may have been
distinguishing the purpose of interrogation from the purpose of
keeping Hamdi from rejoining enemy forces. Indefinite detention for
purposes of interrogation is not authorized; but what about indefinite
detention for the purpose of keeping Hamdi away from enemy lines?
Again, the Court has nothing very clear to say at all. Third, even if
242. See id.
243. Id. at 2641.
244. Id. at 2642.
245. Id. at 2641-42.
246. Id. at 2641; Dworkin, supra note 4, at 29.
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the Court had said explicitly that indefinite detention without
conviction for a crime was not authorized by Congress, that would not
have answered the question whether Congress had the power to
authorize such detention, which, after all, is our question. On the
other hand, if the Court had explicitly concluded that indefinite
detention without conviction was authorized, then given that the
Resolution was not struck down as unconstitutional that would entail
that Congress did have that power under the Constitution. Hamdi
leaves open, then, the question whether Congress might, under the
Constitution, authorize indefinite preventive detention of enemy
combatants.
As it is, the Court has so far said nothing inconsistent with the
principle that where the threat of punishment is effective, indefinite
detention is not justifiable. And it has said nothing to imply that in
these circumstances the threat of punishment will be permanently
ineffective. Captured combatants will fall into two categories. They
will either be chargeable with some crime or they will not. If they are
not chargeable with any crime, they are mere prisoners of war, and
the Court recognized that under international law "[c]aptivity is
neither a punishment nor an act of vengeance, but merely a
temporary detention which is devoid of all penal character."247 The
period of detention is variable, but it is not indefinite, any more than
pretrial detention is indefinite. It comes to an end when the war ends,
however far off that might be. There is no reason to believe that
when personal dangerousness is a condition of confinement, it need
ever come to an end; in many cases it does not. In any case, however,
the status of prisoners of war is a matter of international agreement
and not of constitutional law.
248
Those who are chargeable with or suspected of crimes are a
different matter. They can be prevented "from returning to the field
of battle and taking up arms once again '249 by trying them for their
crimes and imprisoning them. To the Fourth Circuit's objection that
"the burden of litigating the circumstances of wartime captures
halfway around the globe" 25 ° justified detention without process,
there are a number of obvious replies. First of all, the plaintiffs in
247. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2640 (citations omitted).
248. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 136; Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2638 (noting that "the court likewise
rejected Hamdi's Geneva Convention claim, concluding that the convention is not self-
executing and that, even if it were, it would not preclude the Executive from detaining
Hamdi until the cessation of hostilities." (citation omitted)).
249. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2640.
250. Id. at 2638.
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Hamdi, Padilla, and Rasul are not being held on the field of battle.
Although Hamdi and the Rasul plaintiffs were captured in
Afghanistan, they are all, including Padilla, imprisoned in the United
States or on territory controlled by the United States, none of which
is a field of battle.21 They are not halfway around the world.
But even if they were being held on the field of battle in
Afghanistan, and even if the military could not reasonably be
expected to carry the burden of litigating their cases, that does not
justify indefinite detention. Should the war continue long enough,
military tribunals can be arranged for. More importantly, as the facts
in the three cases demonstrate, prisoners can be transported behind
the lines to a secure area, perhaps even as far as South Carolina,
where the civil courts are open and operating.
CONCLUSION
The issue is whether, under the Constitution, our government
can authorize indefinite preventive detention solely on the basis of
dangerousness. Ronald Dworkin has said that:
[T]he justices' arguments [in the Hamdi case] provide the legal
basis for a much more powerful conclusion than the Court itself
drew-that the Constitution does not permit the government to
hold suspected enemy combatants or terrorists indefinitely
without charging and convicting them of crimes ... unless they
are treated in effect as prisoners of war.252
There is nothing in that case that is even relevant to the question of
constitutionality. Nevertheless the Court could decide as Dworkin
would have them decide. Nothing in the opinion or in precedent
forecloses that option. In particular, the cases cited by Judge
Mukasey and discussed throughout this Article do not foreclose that
option.
Should the Court go in that direction? Should the Court find
indefinite detention of sane offenders unconstitutional? The
argument has been made that even if indefinite detention is not
generally authorized by the Constitution, terrorism and war create
situations in which Congress and the Executive must be permitted to
indefinitely detain dangerous people. I have argued on moral and
political grounds that such detention is not desirable in the case of
251. Id. at 2633 (South Carolina); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2711, 1716 (2004)
(South Carolina); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2690 (2004) (Guantanamo Bay Naval
Base, Cuba).
252. Dworkin, supra note 4, at 26.
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those who are sane and in control of their behavior, whatever danger
they present, and I have tried to show that that conclusion is
consistent with our constitutional jurisprudence.
Salerno drove a wedge into the structure built out of habeas
corpus, constitutional protections for the accused, and common law
presumptions about innocence and detainability. The point is to find
a way to stop the wedge before it shatters the structure. One way to
stop it is to draw the line at indefinite detention of those who are
either insane or unable to control their behavior.
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